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Abstract: 
In The Golden Notebook (1962), The Four-Gated City (1969) and Briefing for a 
Descent into Hell (1971), Doris Lessing examines the inadequacies of traditional 
models of madness and replaces them with an anti-psychiatric model. While 
ostensibly the three novels strive to conceive of madness in terms of R. D. Laing’s 
anti-psychiatric theories, this paper will argue that they in fact serve to reveal an 
impasse between Laing’s “lived body” (but gender neutral) theory of schizophrenia 
and the discursively constructed, “inscribed” bodies of Lessing’s female characters. 
Lessing’s madness novels deconstruct Laing’s phallocentric approach to 
schizophrenia by rewriting his theory of madness as a gendered and embodied 
experience.  
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Introduction 
Doris Lessing’s The Golden Notebook (1962), The Four-Gated City (1969) and Briefing 
for a Descent into Hell (1971) engage explicitly and critically with R. D. Laing’s 1960s’ 
anti-psychiatry movement; however, this extensive nine-year examination ends with 
the still-institutionalised madwoman and the proclamation that “she knows it is all a 
load of old socks” (Lessing 1982, 229). This idiosyncratic phrase was also used by 
Lessing in relation to another recurring theoretical and political theme in her oeuvre 
during this period. In her last interview with The Telegraph in 2008 she answered 
“Yes I called Marxism ‘the sweetest dream’ in one of my books. Then I discovered it 
was all a load of old socks. It seems incredible now that quite intelligent people 
believed in it all” (Farndale 2013). In Lessing’s engagement with socialist politics, as 
with her engagement with feminism and other grand narratives of the Twentieth 
Century, there is no simple polemic to stand as her “truth;” rather her works act as 
an on-going examination and interrogation – a “working through” – of the viability 
and implications of particular political and/or philosophical positions. Her interest in 
mental illness and anti-psychiatry is no exception. 
Mental illness has been a preoccupation of Lessing’s work from her first 
publication, The Grass is Singing (1950), in which Mary Turner’s sanity gradually 
disintegrates under the “angry sun” of the African veld until finally the “short strip of 
daylight” separating her from “the fatal darkness” is extinguished in the closing 
pages (Lessing 1994, 195). This theme comes to the fore in her 1962 novel The 
Golden Notebook in which Lessing engages with a specifically anti-psychiatric 
approach to madness as her heroine, Anna Wulf, faces the “chaos” of reintegrating 
her compartmentalised selves. In The Four-Gated City (1969), the final instalment in 
the Children of Violence quintet, Lessing continues to engage with Laing’s notion that 
breakdown might in fact be breakthrough, moving from realism to science fiction in 
order to fully realise the potential of these ideas. The final text I discuss, Briefing for 
a Descent into Hell (1971), is generally considered Lessing’s most “Laingian” novel 
but I argue it is here that Lessing finally ends her contentious textual relationship 
with Laing and, through parody, expresses her disappointment and derision over the 
failed potential of anti-psychiatry, particularly for women. As with her engagement 
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with Marxism, what appeared to be “the sweetest dream” eventually became “a 
load of old socks.” 
 
From Laing to Lessing 
The term “anti-psychiatry” was coined in the UK by David Cooper in 1967 but the 
movement’s beginnings are to be found in the 1960 publication of The Divided Self 
by the charismatic Glaswegian psychiatrist R. D. Laing. Like Thomas Szasz in the US, 
Laing’s work positioned itself in direct opposition to the institutionalisation, physical 
treatments, drug therapy, and “brainwashing” (Laing 1988, 12) of the traditional 
psychiatric establishment. In its place, he envisioned a partnership between 
psychiatrist and patient in which the primary aim was to understand the patient’s 
particular sense of “being-in-the-world” and make “madness, and the process of 
going mad, comprehensible” (9). Instead of understanding schizophrenia as a disease 
to be diagnosed and cured, Laing re-imagines it as “a special strategy that a person 
invents in order to live in an unlivable situation” (Laing 1970, 95). Caught in an 
“untenable position” (95) with a diminishing sense of ontological security, the 
patient seeks to protect the self by splitting it from the body: the schizoid’s “special 
strategy” is thus an increasing disengagement from the body that divides self from 
other through a complex system of false selves. 
Although initially aimed at clinicians within the field, The Divided Self found 
an audience in a generation of anti-establishment intellectuals. Elaine Showalter 
describes Laing as “the mentor of the counterculture in all of its political, 
psychedelic, mystical, and especially artistic manifestations” (1988, 233) and Carol 
Klein notes that “by the mid-sixties Laing was in great demand as a lecturer, and the 
darling of a burgeoning television industry” (2000, 198). But the text also spoke to 
patients, spouses, and parents desperately wanting someone to understand their 
plight and expose the inadequacies of conventional treatment. However, just four 
years later, it was the parents who were to find themselves the subjects of Laing’s 
critique. In the co-authored study Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964), Laing and 
A. Esterson argued that “not the individual but the family is the unit of illness: not 
the individual but the family, therefore, needs the clinician’s services to ‘cure’ it” 
(Laing and Esterson 1970, 23). The family – particularly, but not explicitly, the 
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“schizophrenogenic mother” – is identified as the primary cause of the patient’s 
inability to establish a secure sense of “being-in-the-world.”1 This hypothesis was 
further radicalised in The Politics of Experience in which Laing argued that what 
society considers mad behaviour is actually a perfectly valid and sane response to 
not simply a mad family but a mad world. It is here that Laing finally recommends his 
treatment: by journeying into one’s “inner space” (that is, by refusing traditional 
psychiatric care and allowing oneself to confront and experience “madness”) one 
can travel “back to the womb of all things” and return from this inner voyage with a 
far greater understanding and experience of the self and, indeed, the nature of 
humanity (1970, 106). If all people were to undertake this journey, Laing contends, 
the world might be cured of its madness. 
The Politics of Experience sealed Laing’s fame but also his notoriety and in 
fact signalled the downfall of the anti-psychiatric movement; he had become, as 
Zbigniew Kotowicz phrases it, the “maverick guru of schizophrenics” (1997, 3). Laing 
was a victim of his own success as well as a victim of an emerging second-wave 
feminist politics: in 1972, Phyllis Chesler’s ground-breaking study, Women and 
Madness, charged Laing with remaining “unaware of the universal and objective 
oppression of women and its particular relation to madness in women” (1997, 126); 
in 1974, Juliet Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and Feminism also observed his failure to 
take into account the “significance of patriarchal law” in favour of blaming the 
schizophrenogenic mother (1986, 291). Elaine Showalter (1988) and, more recently, 
Lisa Appignanesi (2009), have noted that Laing’s work undoubtedly contains an 
implicit critique of women’s socially prescribed roles during the period; however, 
because there is no explicit recognition of patriarchal law or the workings of the 
sex/gender system in his texts, he simply perpetuates the familiar correlation 
between women and madness. This oversight seems especially odd considering the 
extent to which Laing’s understanding of the schizophrenic experience in The Divided 
Self is bound up with the self’s relationship to the material body. The body is central 
to Laing’s theoretical model of the schizophrenic experience and yet oddly gender 
neutral; it is here that Doris Lessing’s engagement with his work becomes so crucial.  
Echoes of Laing’s rhetoric and vision resonate throughout The Golden 
Notebook (published two years after The Divided Self), The Four-Gated City, and 
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Briefing for a Descent into Hell, which is extensively informed by Laing’s The Politics 
of Experience. Indeed, Lessing identified Laing as a “key authority figure” (Hardin 
1974, 154) and told Joyce Carol Oates in 1973 that “we were both exploring the 
phenomenon of the unclassifiable experience, the psychological ‘breaking-through’ 
that the conventional world judges as mad” (Oates 1973). Critics have tended to 
view this mutual interest in terms of Lessing’s “ideological apprenticeship to Laing” 
(Sukenick 1974, 113) and the textual relationship between the two has received little 
critical attention since the 1980s.2 Laing’s texts do provide the theoretical framework 
for Lessing’s representations of madness and her distrust of conventional psychiatric 
care; however, rather than an “apprenticeship,” I argue that her three madness 
novels constitute a sustained critique of Laing’s approach. As Showalter claimed in 
1988, “the questions about Laingian women left unanswered . . . come closer to 
being resolved in the novels of Doris Lessing” (1988, 238). In fact, the novels not only 
expose and correct Laing’s inattention to gender but also examine the “matter” of 
the sexed body, bringing anti-psychiatric thinking into dialogue with a then emerging 
second-wave feminist politics but also with the field’s more recent preoccupation 
with the way in which bodies constitute identity. 
 
The Golden Notebook (1962) 
The feminist credentials of Lessing’s The Golden Notebook have been well 
documented and the novel continues to be lauded for its ground-breaking 
examination of Britain’s post-war sexual politics. Lessing famously baulked at the 
novel’s reception as a tract on the “sex war” and, in her Preface to the 1971 edition, 
chose to emphasise what she felt was the “central theme” that had been missed: 
“This theme of ‘breakdown,’ that sometimes when people ‘crack up’ it is a way of 
self-healing, of the inner self’s dismissing of false dichotomies and divisions” (Lessing 
1989, 8). This might have been lifted directly from the pages of The Politics of 
Experience, it is so “Laingian” in its argument and rhetoric. But while Lessing 
overthrows her novel’s Marxist and feminist agendas for anti-psychiatry in the 
Preface, the text itself continually emphasises the connections between these 
political and philosophical positions. Anna Wulf, the heroine of The Golden 
Notebook, famously describes the housewives she meets while canvassing for the 
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British Communist Party as “lonely women going mad quietly by themselves, in spite 
of husband and children or rather because of them” (Lessing, 1989, 161). This is just 
one explicit example of the way in which the text represents women’s madness as 
directly connected to women’s socially prescribed role of wife and mother in a 
conservative post-war Britain. Of course, the alternative presented in the novel is to 
be a “free woman” like Anna – but she is still a woman in therapy who begins the 
novel with the observation that “the point is, that as far as I can see, everything’s 
cracking up” (25).  
 As “free women,” Lessing’s female characters attempt to resist the 
“exchange market” power dynamic described by Luce Irigaray 15 years later: 
“Woman is never anything but the locus of a more or less competitive exchange 
between two men” and so “for women to undertake tactical strikes” they must 
“keep themselves apart from men long enough to learn to defend their desire … to 
forge themselves a social status that compels recognition, to earn their living in 
order to escape from the condition of prostitute” (1991, 355-356). Anna and her 
friend Molly employ these strategies by raising children outside of the confines of 
marriage, earning their own living, actively engaging in politics, and privileging 
relationships between women over those with men; but they nevertheless find that 
they cannot escape the binds of the heterosexual matrix. In Anna’s novel, for 
instance, when her heroine Ella considers discussing with her female friend a sexual 
encounter with a married man, she “decides not to indulge in these conversations 
with Julia, thinking that two women, friends on a basis of criticism of men are 
Lesbian, psychologically if not physically” (1989, 401). Anna represents her heroine 
as acutely aware of, and influenced by, the laws that govern relationships with other 
women. Ella’s refusal to enter into a lesbian relationship with Julia, even if that 
lesbianism is “psychological” rather than emotional or physical, emphasises the 
difficulty of escaping both those discourses that situate women as mere 
commodities between men and those normative discourses of gender and sexuality 
which institute “compulsory heterosexuality” (Butler 1999, xxix). 
In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler argues that  
 
8 
 
the “coherence” and “continuity” of “the person” are not logical or analytical 
features of personhood, but, rather, socially instituted and maintained norms 
of intelligibility. . . . . “Intelligible” genders are those which in some sense 
institute and maintain relations of coherence and continuity among sex, 
gender, sexual practice, and desire. (1999, 23) 
 
Lessing’s women are caught within the “heterosexualization of desire” (Butler 1999, 
23) produced through regulatory practices; even as they try to create a space outside 
of those laws that prescribe and fix gender norms, they find themselves 
reconsolidating them. Caught within a system which offers only certain kinds of 
legitimate subjectivity, Lessing’s “free women” run just as much risk of turning into 
unintelligible “mad creatures” as the housewives and mothers “alone in … their 
completely functional marriages” (Duras 1975, 431). But by re-writing the 
madwoman in terms of both a feminist agenda and an anti-psychiatric model of 
madness, Lessing’s novel attempts to rethink and move beyond those discourses 
which constitute intelligible subjectivities. 
  
Models of Madness 
To pave the way for an anti-psychiatric response to the connections between gender 
and mental illness, The Golden Notebook sets about examining and detailing the 
inadequacies of the conventional models of madness: the medical model and the 
psychoanalytical model. Anna, who is a recipient of psychoanalysis, is acutely aware 
of the limitations of this particular model. Her psychoanalyst’s methods, rooted in 
Freudian and Jungian theory, reduce individual experience into one example from a 
collection of “origin” stories. All women adhere to a handful of mythic figures – 
Electra, Antigone, Cassandra – whose tragic stories they unconsciously repeat. Anna 
can for the most part “name” herself but what she wants to do – and her therapist 
fails to do – is consider her “experience, a memory, a dream, in modern terms” 
(Lessing 1989, 48; my italics). Rachel Bowlby critiques psychoanalysis’ tendency to 
overlook the importance of modern social contexts in a world now “opened up to 
women in social life, in principle and in practice. . . . It seems anachronistic and 
needlessly hopeless now to cling to a myth in which women’s most fundamental 
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conflicts are determined by the realization that they are women, not men” (2007, 
167-168). The stories psychoanalysis offers to Lessing’s “free women” do not 
sufficiently explain their dis-ease because they do not understand it as a response to 
the modern world in which she must function. In addition, as Foucault has argued, 
such “discourses, and the practices based on them, have played more of a role in the 
normalization of the modern individual than they have in any liberatory processes’ 
(Sawicki 1991, 23).3 Anna’s experience of psychoanalysis thus only offers her a 
narrative of her normalisation and its discontents. 
Anti-psychiatry, on the other hand, is primarily interested in the patient’s 
current social situation and the strategies for managing that situation. Anna 
articulates this to her analyst: “I’m going to make the obvious point that perhaps the 
word neurotic means the condition of being highly conscious and developed. . . . 
People stay sane by blocking off, by limiting themselves” (Lessing 1989, 413). Anna 
interprets her “neurotic” behaviours as conscious and strategic responses to the 
ways in which her (modern) situation is characterised by contradiction, conflict and 
ambivalence. The text, although without mentioning the movement, succinctly 
states the primary tenet of anti-psychiatric thinking: what seems like sanity is 
actually madness and what seems like madness is actually a sane response to what 
has become an insane world – a world which requires one to accept that insanity as 
normal in order to survive.  
 The medical model of madness is less visible in The Golden Notebook than it 
will be in Lessing’s next madness novel, The Four-Gated City. In fact, its very absence 
testifies to Lessing’s belief that it is not a viable option for Anna. The medical model 
contends that mental illness is a biological illness and thus seeks to treat the body to 
“right” the mind. Historically this has resulted in a pervasive myth about the effects 
of the unruly female body on the fragile female mind. Such associations have now 
been thoroughly examined by feminist thinkers in a variety of fields and “advances in 
the field of medicine, neuroscience, clinical psychiatry and psychoanalysis have all 
but eclipsed the crude image of the ‘wandering womb’ . . . acting as an enormous 
sponge which sucked the life-energy of intellect from vulnerable women” (Ussher 
1991, 74). Wandering womb’s aside, traditional models of madness continue to 
perpetuate an implicit but pervasive correlation between the female sex and 
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madness. Paradoxically, one of the ways in which The Golden Notebook registers this 
association is in its representation of male madness, firstly with Tommy, Molly’s son, 
and later with Saul, Anna’s lover. Tommy’s story is particularly revealing.  
Part way through the novel, Tommy attempts suicide by shooting himself in 
the head; the text suggests that in doing so he has effectively performed his own 
lobotomy. This accidental surgery seemingly cures him of his schizoid tendencies. 
While Molly calls him a “Zombie” (Lessing 1989, 335) and Anna notes that “his voice, 
like his movements, [were] slow, full and controlled, every word authorized by a 
methodical brain” (332), his nurses call him a “model patient” (331). Indeed, Tommy 
is a model patient of the medical model. After the failed suicide attempt, the now 
blinded Tommy is suddenly transformed from a severely ontologically insecure 
individual (to use Laing’s terminology) to a rational, logical, and controlled young 
man: he is all “masculine intelligence” (to use Lessing’s terminology (Lessing 1981, 
253)). Anna and Molly, who are experts in the psychoanalytical model, expect to see 
a castrated, “mutilated boy” (Lessing 1989, 334) but instead – by way of the medical 
model – he becomes “the centre of the house, dominating it, conscious of everything 
that went on it, a blind but all-conscious presence” (334). Tommy’s embracing of the 
medical model is also an embracing of the Cartesian division between mind and body 
– a model that subordinates the (weak, vulnerable, feminine) body to the (superior, 
transcendent, masculine) mind – a mind that disavows the workings and processes 
of the body: in this case, sight. As Tommy positions himself on the right side of the 
sane/mad, male/female, mind/body binaries, Anna and Molly find themselves on the 
other: when the blinded Tommy “looks” at Anna, she responds “with a touch of 
hysteria” (449) while Molly is all “hysterical tears” (334) and bodily processes: “she 
put her face in her hands and wept, differently, through her whole body … the bones 
showed, thin and sharp” (335). Grosz writes that “in appropriating the realm of mind 
for themselves, men have nonetheless required a support and cover for their now-
disavowed physicality. Women thus function as the body for men” (1995, 38). As 
Tommy takes refuge in the sane, male mind, his mother and Anna are relegated to 
the hysterical, female body. Lessing’s novel does not simply demonstrate how 
madness and gender are historically and culturally connected but reveals how 
discourses of madness and gender in fact consolidate one another: madness and 
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gender are inextricably linked because of the very madness of gender. It is little 
wonder that Anna is so attracted to anti-psychiatry’s supposedly gender neutral 
alternative to these models of madness. 
 
The Matter of the Body 
In opposition to the two dominant models of madness, Laing dismisses the notion 
that either the body or the mind is the point of “origin,” and instead focuses on the 
patient’s “being-in-the-world” (Laing 1988, 19). What becomes clear in The Divided 
Self is that one’s experience of being-in-the-world is always caught up with the way 
in which one perceives of oneself as being-in-the-body. Laing’s thesis in this respect 
is straightforward: the ontologically secure (sane) person experiences the body as 
part of the self; the ontologically insecure (schizoid) person experiences the body as 
part of the world of others and thus strives to become an “unembodied self” (65). 
Laing writes that “instead of being the core of his true self, the body is felt as the 
core of a false self, which a detached, disembodied, ‘inner,’ ‘true’ self looks on at 
with tenderness, amusement, or hatred as the case may be” (69). Sanity, then, is the 
phenomenological experience of selfhood where mind and body are unified, 
Merleau-Ponty’s “body-as-it-is-lived-by-me” (Grosz 1994, 86); schizophrenia, on the 
other hand, literally enacts the Cartesian rift between mind and body.  
 Laing, drawing on existential-phenomenology, views the body as a “lived 
body,” constructed by way of the psyche’s projection of “the body-schema” (Grosz 
1995, 33) onto its surface. According to Grosz, the concept of the “lived body” is 
“prevalent in psychology, especially psychoanalysis and phenomenology” and “refers 
largely to the lived experience of the body, the body’s internal and psychic 
inscription” (1995, 33). Laing’s troubling of the Cartesian self/body binary, and by 
extension that binary’s lateral association with sanity/madness, has the potential to 
radically rethink the ways in which the experience of schizophrenia can be 
understood; indeed, The Divided Self did just that. But what The Divided Self and 
Laing’s subsequent texts fail to do is to account for how this mind-body relationship 
can operate from within a sex/gender system that constructs male and female 
subjectivity so differently. In Laing’s works, bodies are treated as if gender neutral 
but, as Young and Grosz argue, “lived bodies” are “always, already sexually coded” 
12 
 
(36). Indeed, Lessing’s heroines are clearly “always, already” sexed and their bodies 
thus lend themselves more readily to the “inscriptive” approach to embodiment 
(33). The inscriptive model, Grosz explains, is “derived from Nietzsche, Kafka, 
Foucault, and Deleuze” and “conceives the body as a surface on which social law, 
morality, and values are inscribed” (33). This inscriptive approach renders the body 
into a decipherable text while simultaneously generating a sense of “an interior, an 
underlying depth, individuality, or consciousness” (34). The implication for feminist 
theory, as Butler has argued, is that bodies, and thus subjects, are discursively 
constructed to meet the expectations of a patriarchal, heterosexual matrix. For 
women this has meant embodying the devalued side of a litany of binary 
oppositions, not least the body itself. As Iris Marion Young has argued, ‘the relations 
between immanence and transcendence, between owning and being a body, 
between subject and object or one subject and another, are not the same for 
women as for men’ (Grosz 1994, 108). Lessing encounters this fundamental problem 
when she attempts to represent Anna’s schizophrenic experience in terms of Laing’s 
notion of unembodiment, a deviation from his (sane) “lived body” ideal. 
Towards the end of the novel Anna has a dream in which she finds herself 
looking down on her empty body. A parade of characters from earlier in the novel 
enter the room and “try to fit themselves into Anna’s body. I stood to one side, 
watched, interested to see who would come into the room next” (Lessing 1989, 
522). Anna’s detached “interest” suggests that, in accordance with Laing’s 
understanding of schizoid experience, she does not consider her body to be part of 
her “self” but rather part of the world of others. This situation changes when Paul, 
an old lover and now dead, walks into the room and “dissolved into her” (522). 
When Anna’s body is “filled with the dead Paul” her unembodied “inner self” is 
threatened with complete “disintegration” (523). As a ghost, Paul is the ultimate 
transcendent male and his possession of her body reads as rape, with her body the 
passive receptacle for his disavowed materiality. Anna, from outside of herself, must 
“f[igh]t to re-enter her” body (522), and reclaim it from Paul whose “cool grave 
smile” animates “Anna’s face” (523). When the dream continues, Anna is separated 
from her body once again and finds her “brain” in the head of an Algerian soldier, 
her “skin dark” but her mind her own (523). When suddenly her mind goes out “like 
13 
 
a candle flame” terror drives her from his body and she experiences “the flying 
dream” (523) and is once more unembodied; this does not last and she is driven to 
find another body within which to lodge, this time the body of a young, pregnant 
Chinese peasant. Just as Paul entered her body, so she now enters this body. As in 
the soldier’s body, the Anna-brain thinks its “mechanical thoughts” but this time she 
actively wills her mind to “flicker and wane” (524), to finally overcome her fear and 
accept disintegration. Once again, terror drives her out and she wakes up: “with a 
weary sense of duty I became Anna, like putting on a soiled dress” (524).  
Anna’s dream can be read as a failed attempt at schizoid unembodiment but 
that does not mean it is a triumph of the “lived body” either; when Anna awakes, 
mind and body are not unified. She is “cold, cold” (523) and her body feels like a 
“soiled dress” as opposed to “being flesh and blood and bones, of being biologically 
alive and real” (Laing 1988, 67). Ruth Saxton argues that Lessing “perpetuates a deep 
schism between mind and body, in which the female body is seen as a shell that 
severely limits woman’s experience and both distorts and disguises her identity” 
(1994, 95). Indeed, the different bodies here offer themselves like a series of shells, 
or dresses to use Lessing’s metaphor, each one a signifier of some combination of 
gender, race and/or class oppression; but they don’t disguise “identity,” they 
produce it. Both the “lived” and “inscriptive” models read the body as a site of 
inscription – the first originating from an interior “self” that constructs the body in 
terms of an “imaginary anatomy” (Grosz 1994, 33) and the second from external 
socio-political forces that mark, sculpt, libidinize, medicalize, mechanise and, 
significantly, normalize the body according to dominant discourses of intelligibility. 
Grosz writes: 
 
It is not clear to me that these two approaches are compatible or capable of 
synthesis. . . . . The body can be regarded as a kind of hinge or threshold: it is 
placed between a psychic or lived interiority and a more socio-political 
exteriority that produces interiority through the inscription of the body’s 
outer surface. Where psychoanalysis and phenomenology focus on the body 
as it is experienced and rendered meaningful, the inscriptive model is more 
concerned with the processes by which the subject is marked, scarred, 
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transformed, and written upon or constructed by the various regimes of 
institutional, discursive, and nondiscursive power as a particular kind of body. 
(33) 
 
When Anna enters the bodies of others, the inscription seemingly comes from 
within: it is Anna’s brain that forms the body, just as it is Paul’s ghost that possesses 
and animates the Anna body; however, the brain makes sense of the body through 
its “progressive and liberal” (524) ideas, making it signify by reference to the external 
cultural codes, politics and histories which determine its existence and value. Paul 
and Anna’s body-hopping suggests an arbitrary relationship between mind and body 
– and, as Butler will later argue, gender and sex – but at the same time the body is 
shown to be wholly constitutive of subjectivity. While Laing’s work offers Lessing the 
concept of the “lived body” and the potential to see beyond gender by adopting a 
phenomenological framework, as Toril Moi would later advocate in her essay ‘What 
is a Woman?’ (1999), Anna’s dream keeps returning to bodies inscribed and made 
intelligible by socio-political exteriority. Anna will continue to wear her “soiled dress” 
and, in the closing pages, when she emerges from her madness, it is only to once 
more “become Anna, Anna the responsible” (564). The Golden Notebook thus 
reveals an impasse between Laing’s theory and Lessing’s understanding of female, 
embodied experience, schizoid or otherwise. 
 
The Four-Gated City (1969) 
In the late 1960s both Laing and Lessing published books with a much more 
optimistic view of schizophrenia and its potential. As early as The Divided Self, Laing 
alluded to the idea that the “cracked mind of the schizophrenic may let in light which 
does not enter the intact minds of many sane people whose minds are closed” (Laing 
1988, 27). Lessing offers a (very) similar sentiment in The Golden Notebook when 
Anna tells her therapist that “sometimes I meet people, and it seems to me the fact 
they are cracked across, they’re split, means they are keeping themselves open for 
something” (1989, 416). In these early works, neither writer pursues this line of 
thinking but in the spirit of the later 1960s both shift their focus from a rather clinical 
and gloomy description of schizophrenic experience to a far more fantastical and 
15 
 
Utopian assessment of its potential. For Laing, this takes the form of the restorative 
“inner journey” where the schizophrenic – now voyager – undergoes a 
transformative journey and an “existential rebirth” (Laing 1970, 106). For Lessing – 
who will examine this inner journey in more detail in her later novel, Briefing for a 
Descent into Hell – the focus remains on the relationship between madness and the 
gendered body but this time in terms of how mind and body might work together to 
access higher planes of consciousness and usher in a new stage of human evolution. 
The Four-Gated City attempts to realise the unfulfilled hopes of The Golden 
Notebook by gradually deconstructing the discourses which inscribe Anna and 
produce her gendered subjectivity. 
According to Butler, cracks in the performance of intelligible subjectivity 
allow for new possibilities. Butler asks “even if heterosexist constructs circulate as 
the available sites of power/discourse from which to do gender at all, the question 
remains: What possibilities of recirculation exist? Which possibilities of doing gender 
repeat and displace through hyperbole, dissonance, internal confusion, and 
proliferation the very constructs by which they are mobilized?” (1999, 41-42). 
Madness, the “cracked mind,” might momentarily disrupt the performance of 
intelligible subjectivity but it is readily absorbed back into systems of normality 
through the labelling and categorisation of mental illnesses via conventional 
psychiatry, hence Anna’s return to her body and “normality” at the end of The 
Golden Notebook. However, by rejecting those labels – by exposing the fallacy of 
such labelling, as Laing does in The Politics of Experience – the potential for madness 
to be reimagined, and thus for intelligible subjectivity to be reimagined, is a 
possibility once more. As Butlerian “spectres of discontinuity and incoherence” (23), 
Lessing’s female characters in The Four-Gated City threaten to “crack open” – or 
deconstruct – the notion of intelligible subjectivity. 
At the beginning of The Four-Gated City, Martha, cloaked in a long “heavy 
black coat” (Lessing 1981, 16), wanders the streets of London; she has no home, job, 
dependents or attachments. As she moves anonymously and androgynously across 
the city, “without boundaries, without definition” (14), Martha enters a new physical 
state; this state is produced through lack of sleep and food, methodical exercise, or 
highly ritualised acts of sexual intercourse uncomplicated by love or attachment. By 
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entering into this particular way of being-in-the-world she is able to access different 
planes of consciousness in which she can “see” the past and future. The body – and 
the management of bodily mechanics – is essential to this process; as Jean Pickering 
points out, it is “through the medium of the flesh [that] Martha attains her first truly 
visionary experience” (1980, 26). But it is also made possible because of the way in 
which her body exists as an uninscribed surface – unmarked by the social order that 
Martha has momentarily escaped.  
When Martha relinquishes this freedom and anonymity to gain employment, 
she is forced to look elsewhere for access to these other planes of consciousness 
and, through her encounters with the quintessential career-madwoman, Lynda, she 
slowly begins to recognise the potential of schizophrenia. In order to become 
Butler’s unintelligible “spectre,” Martha experiments with using madness to 
separate her sense of self from both her female body and her “masculine 
intelligence” (Lessing 1981, 253), the same “intelligence” the Anna-brain used to 
inscribe the bodies in which she dwelled, including her own. In doing so, Martha 
gradually sheds the discourses that construct her as intelligible to emerge as a 
resistant subject. Martha, who has already abandoned her daughter in an earlier 
instalment of the series, now also rejects her mother’s attempts at reconciliation, 
extricating herself from the matrilineal line of female inheritance of gendered social 
norms;4 she also rejects Mark (her lover) and her (hetero)sexual identity, favouring 
instead a woman-woman relationship with Mark’s mad wife, Lynda. Saxton describes 
this as a “post-erotic friendship which replaces the erotic with a spiritual or political 
energy understood as healing” (1994, 116). Martha sacrifices her daughter, her 
mother, her sexuality and her intelligibility as a gendered subject; she also slowly 
removes herself from family, politics and society, choosing to descend into Lynda’s 
basement. 
 Unencumbered by gender, sex or structures of meaning predicated on 
difference, Martha escapes inscription and is able to access the “lived body” – the 
body as produced through “psychic inscription” (Grosz 1995, 33). Indeed, in a 
rewriting of Anna’s failed experience of unembodiment, Martha is now able to 
transform her body into “an elderly man,” “a young man,” “a small white horse,” or 
a “tree, a glittering faceted individuality of breathing green,” all imbued with “the 
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sense of herself [that] had no sex” (Lessing 1981, 243). This gender-neutral self is 
free to become “the instrument, the receiving device” able to generate that 
“sensitive state” (56) of receptiveness and psychic energy which allows Martha to 
communicate telepathically and see the future. This later novel proves Anna’s 
hypothesis – at last the people who “are cracked across,” “keeping themselves open 
for something” (Lessing 1989, 416), have succeeded in finding that “something.” 
However, when Martha emerges from the basement she is confronted with “a near-
race of half, uncompleted creatures . . . sleep-walking” through life in their 
“hideously defective bodies” (Lessing 1981, 521, 522). Just as Anna scurries back to 
her body, so Martha scurries back to the basement, appalled by the abomination 
that is humankind. The text is left with two choices: register Martha’s breakthrough 
as an individual triumph but a revolutionary failure, or destroy them all. Lessing 
chooses the latter and the hitherto realist novel gives way to a post-apocalyptic 
world. 
In The Politics of Experience Laing calls for all of humankind to undergo the 
transformative inner journey to enlightenment but such a utopian fantasy is 
replaced in Lessing’s novel with the (much easier) dystopian apocalypse. With a 
severely depleted population the “new normal” can flourish and give birth to a race 
of superhumans, psychically connected across space and time. Humankind takes a 
leap forwards, which is really a leap back: an “undoing” of all the crippling practices 
and discourses of the Golden Age. But all of this is only possible through apocalypse. 
Lessing’s novel realises the potential of Laing’s reimagining of madness, of the 
potential of the “lived body,” but she has to all but end the world to do it.  
 
Briefing for a Descent into Hell (1971) 
The Golden Notebook ends without finding an escape from gendered discourses of 
madness or the madness of gendered discourses, and The Four-Gated City can only 
envision a way beyond these through a relinquishing of the markers of female 
embodiment (children, mothers, sex, heterosexual love) and a fantasy of apocalypse. 
Lessing’s final and ostensibly most Laingian madness novel is thus charged with 
either resolving or consolidating the impasse between Laing’s theories and Lessing’s 
politics. At first glance, the difficulty of translating theory into fiction seems to have 
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been solved by a decision to simply narrativise one of Laing’s case studies. The 
framework for the protagonist’s story in Briefing for a Descent into Hell, despite 
Lessing’s claims to the contrary, is lifted straight from the pages of Laing’s The 
Politics of Experience and his account of Jesse Watkins’ “Ten Day Voyage.”5 Laing 
introduces Watkins’ story as a “an account of his voyage into inner space and time” 
(Laing 1970, 120) and it is presented as a successful example of Laing’s notion of the 
schizophrenic inner journey to enlightenment as healing. In addition, both writers 
have seemingly abandoned the madwomen of their previous works to embrace the 
figure of the male hero. 
The inner journey is described by Laing in terms of a male, adventure-
narrative; the supposedly gender-neutral schizophrenics of The Divided Self and 
Sanity, Madness and the Family (who were mostly women) disappear to be replaced 
by a new supposedly gender-neutral brave voyager (who is clearly male). He is the 
“voyager, the explorer, the climber, the space man” (Laing 1970, 105). The 
madwoman appears only as the sad, tortured patient of Emil Kraepline whose 
account of a psychiatric examination Laing draws upon to reiterate his earlier 
argument: that madness can be made comprehensible if we acknowledge the 
patient’s particular sense of “being-in-the-world” and that conventional psychiatric 
models are inadequate, harmful and its methods crazier than the patients it purports 
to cure. Thus, in The Politics of Experience, the madwoman appears as a victim of the 
old system but never as a voyager in this new incarnation of madness. The shift from 
the psychotic to the psychedelic, as Peter Sedgwick has argued, “was an inevitable 
move in [Laing’s] campaign to upgrade the status of the apparently abnormal and 
insane” without which “we are left with the position that the schizophrenic is a 
disabled victim . . . whose basic perceptions and reactions can only to a limited 
degree be understood in terms of ‘intelligibility’” (1971, 43). This “upgrade” also 
appears to necessitate a shift in gender: when madness becomes reimagined as a 
perilous and exciting adventure, an “ancient quest, with its pitfalls and dangers” 
(Laing 1970, 112), it becomes man’s work. 
 
Problematically, Lessing’s final madness novel also registers this shift – the 
Annas, Lyndas and Marthas of her previous texts are replaced with her own male 
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adventurer. Featuring a male protagonist may have been a way of circumnavigating 
the prominence critics tended to give the theme of the “sex war” in her novels, but it 
might also have been a strategic choice in terms of her subject matter.6 Mona Knapp 
argues that “Lessing’s choice of a male protagonist contributes to the book’s force, 
since society often stamps hysteria and irrationality as intrinsically female traits” 
(1984, 106). Likewise, Lynn Sukenick “suspects . . . that a man was chosen in order to 
give madness its fullest due and its deepest persuasion” (1974, 116). Lessing’s 
decision, then, may have arisen out of a desire for her novel, which was already 
pushing at the limits of literary merit by moving into the fantasy/science fiction 
genre, to be taken seriously. By shedding the hysterical women of her previous texts 
and constructing her narrative through the perspective of the mad but male hero 
(white, middle-class and a university Professor to boot), Lessing increases the 
credibility of her (and Laing’s) alternative theory of madness. 
Interestingly, because of this switch in the main protagonist’s gender, Sydney 
Janet Kaplan and Elaine Showalter both dismissed the significance of sex/gender for 
readings of the schizophrenic experience in Briefing for a Descent into Hell. Kaplan 
writes that “the issue of sexuality seems to have been eliminated from Briefing” 
(1974, 120) and Showalter argues that it “does not make connections between 
female powerlessness and schizophrenia” because “Lessing’s novels were no longer 
concerned with the schizophrenic journey as a woman’s exploration of self” (1988, 
241). But this too readily discounts the sex/gender politics that do remain at play in 
this novel and remain of significance to understanding the relationship between 
Laing’s radical revision of madness in The Politics of Experience and gendered 
embodiment in Lessing’s novels. I am offering an alternative interpretation of 
Lessing’s decision to shift to a male hero and of the sex/gender politics in this novel. I 
read Briefing for a Descent into Hell as a parody of Laing’s The Politics of Experience – 
one which deliberately chooses a male hero (significantly also named Watkins) to 
expose the gender bias of Laing’s work, as well as registering his abandonment and 
betrayal of the madwomen who remain not only the “disabled victims” of 
conventional psychiatric care, but who are forced to bear the collateral damage of 
the male hero’s journey and rebirth.  
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The Inner Journey 
There are two interwoven halves to Briefing for a Descent into Hell: one takes place 
in the “real” world of the psychiatric institution and the other takes place in the 
“cosmic” world of Charles’ inner journey. It is through Charles’ encounters with 
women during both the cosmic narrative thread and the real world thread that the 
text produces a feminist critique of Laing’s inner journey. What both narratives 
register is the necessity of the presence of the female body for Charles’ ability to 
embark upon his transcendent journey. In the cosmic narrative this is established 
from the very beginning – as he sets off on his boat (he is the Captain) the men wave 
to the women they leave behind, most notably “Conchita” who sings for the sailors 
(Lessing 1982, 20). Conchita – meaning conception, and more specifically the 
immaculate conception (Sheehan 2001, 69) – is the ideal of female embodiment: a 
reproductive but chaste body, imprisoned on an island, waiting for the male hero to 
return. The island women are earthbound whilst Charles is not only seabound but 
skybound – destined to ascend into the crystal/cosmos to then later descend as a 
god-like saviour. The beginning of this cosmic narrative returns us to a series of 
binary oppositions: male/female, mind/body, active/passive, free/imprisoned, 
cosmic/earthbound, transcendent/embodied. For Charles to be the transcendent 
male hero, free to ascend to the cosmos, he must renounce his own materiality and 
displace it onto the women. Grosz writes that “men are able to dominate knowledge 
paradigms because women take on the function of representing the body, the 
irrational, the natural, or other epistemologically devalued binary terms. By 
positioning women as the body, they can project themselves and their products as 
disembodied, pure, and uncontaminated” (1995, 42). From within Charles’ 
“disembodied, pure and uncontaminated” anti-psychiatric inner space, the female 
body asserts itself as the embodied, impure, and contaminated matter he has 
disavowed. Just as the medical model allowed Tommy to occupy the transcendent, 
unembodied realm of “masculine intelligence,” so now anti-psychiatry makes 
recourse to the male-mind/female-body binary associations in order to formulate 
the inner journey.  
The evidence for Lessing’s text as parodic is in the numerous correlations 
between the two works – Charles’ surname, the presence of the sea voyage, the very 
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language of the text7 – but it is most clearly represented as a feminist critique in the 
way in which Lessing chooses to narrate the critical stage of Charles’ inner journey: 
“from being outside (post-birth) back into the womb of all things (pre-birth)” (Laing 
1970, 106). Lessing does not choose to do this through infantilisation (as in Jesse’s 
account where he regresses until he “had no brain at all” and “felt as if I were like a 
baby” (124)) but rather registers this stage through Charles’ encounter with a hostile 
natural environment: 
 
For it was now evident that ahead of me was a narrow cleft. . . . I went up 
into it. . . . Now I had to squirm my way up, my feet on one wall, my back and 
shoulders against the other. It was a slow, painful process . . . The evil-
smelling cleft I had come through now seemed to have had no real part in my 
journey, for its dark and constriction seemed foreign to the vast clear space 
of the way I had been. (Lessing 1982, 44-45) 
 
Instead of presenting a narrative of regression, Lessing foregrounds the body 
through which “existential rebirth” (Laing 1970, 106) is made possible. Charles’ 
journey as metaphorical rebirth – out of the dense forest (womb), up the steep 
mountainside (birthing canal), his “slow, painful” “squirm[ing]” through the “evil-
smelling cleft” (vagina) and final exposure on a ledge from which he looks back at 
the “vast clear space” of the East (the world) – clearly isn’t subtle. The text 
constructs a female body from the natural environment – one that is “evil-smelling,” 
“dark,” “constrict[ing]” and “foreign.” When he emerges he recognises his reflection 
in the glassy surface of the rock and enters the Symbolic, separating himself from the 
cleft (the mother’s body) and allowing him to ascend the cliff face: “I had to go up” 
(Lessing 1982, 45). Shortly afterwards he will enter civilisation in the form of the 
ruined city. The female-nature/male-culture binaries are clearly demarcated and 
Lessing represents how the former is the foreign Other which makes possible the 
male entry to language, civilisation and knowledge. Charles’ existential rebirth is 
predicated on woman’s embodiment – she is the condition by which he can journey 
into enlightenment and the site upon which he can discard his own materiality. 
Lessing’s text exposes the tension between the phallogocentrism of the quest 
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narrative – in which the female body is an obstacle through which to pass, to leave 
behind, and to define oneself against – and Laing’s claims to universality. 
 A second encounter with the female body during the cosmic narrative makes 
a further connection between women, the body and madness. Before Charles is 
absorbed into the light of the crystal, he stumbles upon three women. The women 
are archetypes – Shakespeare’s weird sisters – who lure him into their bloody orgy-
feast. As Jeanette King has observed, Charles is “‘moonstruck,’ ‘mooncrazed,’ 
‘lunatic.’ His sudden consciousness of a smell of blood implicitly connects the moon’s 
phases with the female menstrual cycle, underlining the traditional association 
between the moon, female sexuality, and insanity” (1989, 56). Female lunacy is 
portrayed as monstrous, carnal, chaotic and bodily – and as such is set in stark 
contrast, and as a danger, to Charles’ spiritual and transcendent anti-psychiatric 
journey. The differences between the two versions of madness couldn’t be less 
ambiguous or more overstated. The madwoman is flesh, unholy and bloody, ready to 
eat her own children; the madman is mind, soon to become “a shape in light” 
(Lessing 1982, 89) akin to de Beauvoir’s notion of the “pure Idea, the One, the All, 
the absolute spirit” (1997, 177).  
 
Another Dress and Old Socks 
While the cosmic narrative thread uses archaic metaphors, stock characters and 
hyperbole to parody Laing’s work, the real world narrative thread takes a much 
subtler approach, easily overlooked. Indeed, readings of Briefing of a Descent into 
Hell take little notice of Violet Stoke, a peripheral character who surfaces at the end 
of the book and seems to figure as a character akin to the nineteenth-century 
madwoman traditionally resigned to the margins of textual representation: a mere 
plot device. Violet is a young schizophrenic whom Charles befriends during his stay 
at the hospital and she functions as his female equivalent. If Charles is the 
“everyman” she, like Lynda in The Four-Gated City, is the “every-schizo-woman.” The 
two characters represent the two poles of madness: one which readily translates 
into Laing’s re-imagining of madness as a journey to enlightenment and one which 
represents madness as female, embodied and irreversibly “shipwrecked.”  
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Before anything is revealed about Violet’s character the reader is offered a 
lengthy description of her appearance, beginning from the top and working its way 
down. The upper half of Violet “conform[s] both to our current ideas about beauty in 
women, and that moment’s fashion” (Lessing 1982, 226). This upper half is the ideal 
of chaste femininity: she wears a dress with a high neck and long sleeves. But the 
text then reveals that the dress is a mini-dress, and the lower half is offered in stark 
contrast to the upper:  
 
The girl’s legs were not quite bare. She wore extremely fine, pale-grey tights. 
But she did not wear any panties. She sat with her legs sprawled apart in a 
way that suggested that she had forgotten about them, or that she had 
enough to do to control and manage the top half of her, without all the 
trouble of remembering her legs and her sex as well. Her private parts were 
evident as a moist dark fuzzy patch, and their exposure gave her a naïve, 
touching, appealing look. (227) 
 
The nurses observe that “her way of sitting there, dressed in a parody of a 
housekeeper’s dress with her sex on view was a challenge to their sanity” (228). The 
use of the word parody and the suggestion that exposed female genitals might cause 
insanity emphasise Violet’s function in the narrative – she is there to expose the 
continuing link between female embodiment and madness and mock Laing’s 
attempts to circumvent her presence in his reimagining of madness. Violet does this 
by being too female. Just “sitting there,” Violet is a troubling figure, reminiscent of 
Anna in the final pages of The Golden Notebook when, after re-entering her body as 
if a “soiled dress,” she lays with her “private parts” a “wet sticky centre” that 
“seemed disgusting” (Lessing 1989, 532). However, instead of trying to escape the 
virgin/whore binary, as Anna does in her attempts to be a “free woman,” Violet tries 
to encompass both; in doing so, she becomes uncanny and disturbing – mad. She is, 
quite literally, a “divided self” with that divide drawn across her midsection, 
separating her reproductive organs from the upper, more “proper” self.  
Violet’s madness then is a madness that is quite clearly represented in terms 
of the impossibility of attempting to simultaneously encompass those two opposing 
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poles of intelligible womanhood. The year after Lessing published Briefing, Phyllis 
Chesler argued that madness is understood either in terms of one’s gender failing to 
correspond to the sexed body (female bodies exhibiting masculine behaviours, for 
instance) or simply being too female, as in this case: “women who fully act out the 
conditioned female role are clinically viewed as ‘neurotic’ or ‘psychotic’” (1997, 93). 
Chesler’s understanding of madness looks ahead to Judith Butler’s central thesis in 
Gender Trouble: that is, when “gender does not follow from sex,” or when the 
gender performance goes so far as to parody its “natural” sex, the person then 
becomes a “developmental failure” with the potential to “expose the limits and 
regulatory aims of that domain of intelligibility” (1999, 24). Violet is this 
“developmental failure” and as such is Lessing’s greatest indictment against anti-
psychiatry’s claim to revolutionary power and universality.  
The importance of Violet’s appearance at the end of the novel is made clear 
by what appears to be a metafictional break in the narrative. The impersonal 
narrator, describing Violet’s presence on the ward, digresses and starts to muse on 
Goya’s early paintings and their disturbing, uncanny quality – a quality, the narrator 
explains, that comes from having one person in the picture stare back at the 
spectator:  
 
This person who refuses to conform to the conventions of the picture the 
artist has set him in, questions and in fact destroys the convention. It is as if 
the artist said to himself: I suppose I’ve got to paint this kind of picture, it is 
expected of me – but I’ll show them. As you stand and gaze in, all the rest of 
the picture fades away, the charmers in their smiles and flounces, the young 
heroes, the civilization, all those dissolve away because of that long straight 
gaze from the one who looks back out of the canvas and says silently that he 
or she knows it is all a load of old socks. . . . . The eyes of Violet Stoke had the 
same effect, that of negating the rest of her appearance – and perhaps of 
saying the same thing. (Lessing 1982, 229-230) 
 
Indeed, it is Violet, with her “long straight gaze,” who breaks through in the final 
pages to negate the rest of the narrative. By the end of the novel, the charming, 
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young(ish) hero and the civilizations and places he has seen during his inner journey, 
“fade[] away.” In fact, Charles doesn’t even fulfil Laing’s journey or his “cosmic” 
mission – in the real world narrative his eventual cure comes from electroshock 
therapy. Charles returns to his wife, his children and his career, back to where the 
world determines that he – a white, heterosexual male – belongs. And Violet, with 
her too female body, remains where she belongs: institutionalised, neither able to 
access the inner journey to enlightenment nor adapt herself to a coherent, 
legitimate gender identity. Her stare, her body, her femaleness, destabilises the rest 
of the narrative, calling attention to herself and, in “refus[ing] to conform . . . 
questions and in fact destroys the convention.” And this is Lessing breaking the 
surface of the narrative too. Suddenly we have an impersonal narrator who, like 
Violet, calls attention to the convention and exposes her parodic approach to “the 
kind of [novel] expected of me.” Lessing’s long and detailed examination of the 
potential of anti-psychiatry over three novels and nine years ends here, with the 
author breaking through to say, alas, it “was all a load of old socks” after all. 
 
Conclusion 
In 2013, Lorna Sage’s obituary acknowledged the ways in which Lessing “allowed 
herself to be inconsistent” and “seemed open to change in a new way:” 
 
Even her talent for demolition and her habit of cutting her losses were not to 
be relied upon. She was adept at tracing sly signs of continuity where that 
particular path through the narrative woods had been overgrown and 
bypassed time, out of mind – not least by Lessing. (Sage 2013) 
 
Anti-psychiatry was “overgrown” and “bypassed” in her work by the mid-1970s, at 
which point the anti-psychiatry movement and its cultural figurehead, R. D. Laing, 
had also fallen out of fashion. In Lessing’s 1979 novel, Shikasta, Johor reports that he 
knows what it is to “accept failure, final and irreversible, of an effort or experiment” 
(Lessing 1986, 13); this could easily refer to Lessing’s attempts to reconcile Laing’s 
theories with her understanding of female experience. It is therefore all the more 
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significant that, in her final work, Alfred and Emily (2008), over 35 years later, Lessing 
returns to the subject of mental illness: 
 
It was a serious business … neurotic mothers, driving their daughters mad … 
So, how did these pathetic demented women come about? Well, we knew. . . 
. These were women who should have been working, should have worked, 
should have interests in their lives apart from us, their hag-ridden daughters. 
… I look back at the mothers of my generation and shudder and think, Oh, my 
God, never, never let it happen again… (Lessing 2008, 190-191) 
 
In Alfred and Emily, Lessing provides her final word on the question of post-war 
women’s madness. It is characteristic of Lessing that she chooses to recover the 
most controversial aspect of the anti-psychiatry movement’s thesis – the 
“schizophrenogenic mother” – but what Lessing makes clear is that this mother is 
not a “species” but a symptom of the gendered discursive practices that governed a 
particular time and place. Lessing’s madness novels ultimately discredited and 
discarded Laing’s reimagining of madness and the potential of the inner journey for 
the madwomen – what remains, though, is the recognition that madness results 
from untenable lives, particularly for women struggling against inscribed conceptions 
of a selfhood they do not recognise or cannot fulfil – “Oh, my God,” she says “never, 
never let it happen again…” 
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Notes 
                                                     
1 The term “schizophrenogenic mother” was coined by the German psychiatrist 
Frieda Fromm-Reichmann in 1948 (Frith and Johnstone 2003, 111). In The Politics of 
Experience, Laing writes that “if the patients were disturbed their families were often 
very disturbing. . . . At first the focus was mainly on the mothers (who are always the 
first to get blamed for everything), and a ‘schizophrenogenic’ mother was 
postulated, who was supposed to generate disturbance in the child” (1970, 93). As 
he back-tracks, Laing fails to mention here that he and Esterson greatly contributed 
to this narrative in Sanity, Madness and the Family. 
2 The exception is Roberta Rubenstein’s Literary Half-Lives: Doris Lessing, Clancy 
Sigal, and Roman à Clef (2014), a study of the intertextual relations between Doris 
Lessing and the American writer Clancy Sigal which, inevitably, also includes Laing: 
Sigal was Laing’s patient while also Lessing’s lover. 
3 Michel Foucault’s Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of 
Reason was published in 1961, one year after Laing’s The Divided Self, and is 
introduced by the British anti-psychiatrist David Cooper. In Psychiatric Power: 
Lectures at the Collège de France 1973-1974, Foucault reads the anti-psychiatry 
movements as an attempt to enact a “demedicalization of madness” (2006, 346).  
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4 For more on the connections between madness and mothering in The Four-Gated 
City see my article “Madness and Mothering in Doris Lessing’s The Four-Gated City 
(1969)” (Myler 2013, 15-20). 
5 In a letter to Roberta Rubenstein, Lessing claims that she had no knowledge of The 
Politics of Experience when she wrote Briefing for a Descent into Hell and the use of 
the name Watkins was mere coincidence (see Rubenstein 1979, 196).  
6 Briefing for a Descent into Hell was published in the same year as Lessing’s preface 
to The Golden Notebook which so vehemently attacked her critics’ tendency to read 
the book only or primarily in terms of the “sex war” debate. 
7 My claim that Lessing might simultaneously deny any connection to the The Politics 
of Experience and yet be quite consciously parodying it, isn’t so implausible – Lessing, 
after all, is the writer who deliberately deceived her publishing house and readers 
when she published under the pseudonym Jane Somers in order to expose the 
industry’s reluctance to publish new writers. 
